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Licensure, Peer Review, and the National
Practitioner Data Bank?
William P. Gunnar,MD.
INTRODUCTION

I am a cardiac surgeon. In 1996, I was asked by a referring cardiologist,
an electrophysiologist specializing in the detection and management of
abnormal heart rhythms, to proctor his first twenty-five pacemaker
implantations.' The community hospital in which we both worked as
independent physicians, each employed by separate private medical
corporations, had credentialed him for surgical pacemaker implantation in
either the operating room or the cardiac catheterization lab, pending my
approval of his surgical technique. What was I to do? My cardiology
colleague never trained as a surgeon, possessed at that time a less than
acceptable understanding of sterile technique, and was in no way prepared
to care for the complications associated with pacemaker implantation,
including pneumothorax, cardiac perforation, vascular injury, or wound
complications.2 On the other hand, I had been safely and successfully
performing pacemaker implantations since 1989, after completing a five. Assistant Chief of Surgery and Chief, Section of Thoracic and Cardiovascular Surgery at
the Hines Veterans Medical Center, and Associate Professor of Surgery at Loyola University
Chicago Stritch School of Medicine. Dr. Gunnar is a fourth-year law student in the part-time
evening division at Loyola University Chicago School of Law.
1. In 1996, technological advances with automatic implantable cardiac defibrillators had
not yet allowed surgical implantation to mirror techniques for implantable pacemakers.
Currently, internal defibrillators and pacemakers are surgically positioned using virtually
identical techniques.
2. Pneumothorax requires immediate placement of a tube within the chest to evacuate
air; cardiac perforation demands immediate exposure of the heart to repair a disruption of the
cardiac muscle; vascular injury potentially is life-threatening and requires immediate
thoracic surgery; and wound complications may require removal of the pacemaker and
possible placement of the pacemaker system on the surface of the heart. All are relatively
rare (1-2%), but are recognized complications of transvenous pacemaker and implantable
defibrillator placement.
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year general surgery residency and beginning a two-year residency in
thoracic and cardiovascular surgery. I was knowledgeable in all aspects of
the surgical implantation of a pacemaker or an implantable defibrillator
device. Previously, only thoracic surgeons were credentialed and privileged
to implant pacemakers and defibrillator devices; but the cardiology staff had
persuaded the hospital credentials committee to reevaluate this policy to
allow non-surgeon cardiologists to perform these surgical procedures.3
My refusal to help my colleague obtain independent privileging to
implant pacemakers and defibrillators would result in loss of cardiac
surgical referrals to my practice and the hospital. Specifically, if I declined
the request to proctor my soon-to-be-competitor's pacemaker implantations,
he and his partners would preferentially admit their patients to another
hospital where he had supposedly been given assurance of his credentialing
for these procedures.
In the end, I fulfilled an obligation to the
credentialing committee through my gratuitous proctoring of my
cardiologist colleague's pacemaker implantations, and signed off on his
privileges. I preserved good will but lost a significant amount of income
from routine pacemaker and defibrillator implantations. 4
Upon reflection of these events, I have questioned the moral correctness
of the hospital credentials committee's decision to privilege the cardiology
staff to perform surgical procedures for which I spent years in training.5
Although I had never begrudged another physician the privilege to make a
living within his or her area of expertise, I was bewildered as to how the
hospital could credential another physician to perform a procedure that I
and fellow surgical colleagues were better prepared to perform. In a way,
my privileges to perform pacemaker and defibrillator implantations were
being constructively revoked.
In fact, my cardiology colleague had every right, under the broad
privilege of his state medical license, to request and obtain hospital
credentials to perform the surgical implantations of pacemakers and
3. The community hospital credentials committee membership included members of the
cardiology staff, but no cardiac surgeons.
4. I continued to perform the pacemaker and defibrillator implantations, responded when
the cardiologist needed help or experienced a complication in his own pacemaker and
defibrillator implantations, thereby assuring the standard of care, and preformed the bulk of
the emergency night, weekend, or holiday pacemaker implantations because my cardiologist
colleague was not available.
5. I was not alone in this experience. Beginning in the mid-1990s, cardiologists across
the country obtained privileges to perform pacemaker and defibrillator implantations.
Presently, cardiology residents specializing in electrophysiology graduate with training in
this surgical procedure provided not by surgeons but by attending cardiologists. In 2004, the
Board of Thoracic Surgery, in response to the infrequency in which cardiac surgeons
perform pacemaker and defibrillator implantations, eliminated pacemaker and defibrillator
implantations from the list of required procedures for board eligibility.
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defibrillator devices, even though based on training and experience I was
the best man for the job. The hospital and the medical staff physicians
empowered to police physician behavior through the actions of the
credentials committee, peer review committee, and hospital board could
freely privilege the cardiology staff to perform these surgical procedures.
However, for the sake of argument, recognizing the public's concern
regarding the high incidence of medical error, 6 rising health care costs, 7 the
continued practice of incompetent physicians, 8 and rising medical
malpractice insurance rates, 9 I ask, "was this the correct decision?"
This commentary will address the following: the rights of the individual
physician to practice freely within the broad privilege of medical licensure;
the rights of the hospital to regulate an individual physician's scope of
practice through the medical staff activities of credentialing and peer
review; and the public's right to high quality, cost-efficient medical care
provided by competent physicians. Part I will discuss medical school
education and the process by which physicians acquire and maintain state
licensure, as well as the potential for disciplinary action from the state
licensing board. Part II will evaluate the impact of physician post-graduate
specialty training, the determinants of a physician's scope of practice by
way of the hospital credentialing process and the rights of the hospital to
grant, limit, or retract privileges through credentialing and peer review
activity. Part III will discuss the rights of an individual physician facing
limitation of his hospital privileges. Part IV will address the public's
limited right to information regarding certain physician behavior that could
trigger the loss of hospital privileges and potential forfeiture of medical
license or the ability to practice within a specialty.

6. See Joan H. Krause, Medical Error as False Claim, 27 AM. J.L. & MED. 181, 181
(2001) ("[M]edical errors have received a great deal of attention in the popular and academic
press.").
7. See Kim Dixon, U.S. Health Costs Rose 9.6% in 2002, Reuters Health Information
(2003) (stating that health care spending in the United States rose 10% in 2001 and 9.6% in
2002, compared to a 2002 increase in U.S. consumer prices of 2.4%. In 2002, spending on
inpatient hospital care grew by 6.8% and the costs of outpatient hospital care rose by
14.6%.).
8. See Jason Leo, Torts-Medical Malpractice: The Legislature's Attempt to Prevent
Cases Without Merit Denies Valid Claims, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 1399, 1400 (2000)
(estimating that 15% of the nation's physicians "are incompetent and should not be
practicing medicine").
9.

See generally U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, Medical Malpractice Insurance:

Multiple Factors Have Contributed To Increased Premium Rates, GAO-03-702 (2003),
availableat http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-702.
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MEDICAL SCHOOL EDUCATION, STATE LICENSURE, AND POTENTIAL
FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION FROM THE STATE LICENSING BOARD

A.

Obtaininga State Medical License

In 1984, after successfully completing four years of medical school at
Northwestern University and one year of post-graduate training and passing
the United States Medical Licensing Examination (USMLE), I became fully
licensed to practice as a physician and surgeon in the State of Illinois. As
far as the State of Illinois was concerned, I could practice with all the rights
and privileges of any other physician as long as I abided by the standards of
conduct for physicians established and enforced by the Illinois State
Medical Board.' 0
The state has a duty to enact laws that regulate the practice of medicine."
In the exercise of its inherent police power, the state has an obligation to
establish legislation directed at "safeguard[ing] the public health and
protect[ing] the public from incompetence, deception and fraud."' 2 Such
legislation may define qualifications necessary to lawfully practice
medicine and surgery, as well3 as require a license or certificate of
competency in order to practice.1
"State medical licensing laws avoid defining allowable medical practice
in terms of specific procedures or methods of practice.' 4 Theoretically,
upon obtaining a professional medical license in the State of Illinois, I could
practice internal medicine, neurosurgery, cardiac surgery, obstetrical care,
dermatology, or any other specialty if I could obtain privileges in a hospital

10. For background on the duties of a state licensing board, see Tara K. Widmer, South
Dakota Should Follow PublicPolicy and Switch to the PreponderanceStandardfor Medical
License Revocation After In Re the Medical License of Dr. Reuben Setliff, MD., 48 S.D. L.
REv. 388, 396 (2003) (noting that a state medical board, authorized to regulate the medical
profession for the general welfare of its citizens, establishes and enforces standards of
conduct for physicians through credentialing and licensing).
11. Katz v. S.D. State Bd. of Med. and Osteopathic Exam'rs, 432 N.W.2d 274, 278
(S.D. 1988).
12. Id. (citations omitted). See also Thomas R. McLean, Crossing the Quality Chasm:
Autonomous Physician Extenders Will Necessitate a Shift to Enterprise Liability Coverage
for Health Care Delivery, 12 HEALTH MATRIX 239, 245-47 (2002) (noting that the U.S.
Constitution limits the power of the federal government to those that are defined. Under the
Constitution the authorization to act in the general welfare of the population was relegated to
the States. Hence, the States rather than the federal government traditionally relegated
public health and medicine under the rubric of "police powers.").
13. Id.
14. Edward P. Richards, The Police Power and the Regulation of Medical Practice:A
Historical Review and Guide for Medical Licensing Board Regulation of Physicians in
ERISA-Qualified Managed Care Organizations,8 ANNALS HEALTH L. 201, 211 (1999).
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or establish a free-standing facility.' 5 Realistically, an introspective opinion
of my overall knowledge and inexperience at the completion of one year of
internship indicated that my capabilities included the care for minor illness
in an outpatient clinic, suturing of relatively minor lacerations, and
diagnosis and triage of more complicated illness to specialty care facilities;
in other words, I could function as a basic primary care physician. The
medical literature has shown that at this stage of my medical career I had a
of acting negligently when marginally supervised or
high likelihood
16
unsupervised.
While completion of medical school and passing the USMLE confirmed
that the general factual knowledge I possessed was sufficient to practice
within the basic standard of care of every licensed physician, it conveyed
nothing of my ethical behavior, truthfulness of practice, or compassion, socalled bedside manner. 17 All the ethical behavior and patient empathy I
possessed were founded in my upbringing, neither formally taught in
medical school nor tested in any way for medical licensure.
In my experience, the core expectations for physician character centered
on recitation of the Hippocratic Oath during medical school orientation with
an assembly of my medical school classmates, 18 as follows:
I swear to fulfill, to the best of my ability and judgment, this covenant:
I will respect the hard-won scientific gains of those physicians in whose
steps I walk, and gladly share such knowledge as is mine with those who
are to follow.

15. See Katz, 432 N.W.2d at 279 ("[T]he legislature, under the guise of protecting the
public health, may not arbitrarily interfere with a person's right to pursue the medical
profession or impose unreasonable restrictions upon the practice of medicine.").
16. See Stewart R. Reuter, M.D., J.D., ProfessionalLiability in PostgraduateMedical
Education: Who is Liable for Resident Negligence?, 15 J. LEGAL MED. 485, 489 (1994)
(citing Trautlein, Lambert, & Miller, Malpractice in the Emergency Department-Review of
200 Cases, 13 ANNALS EMERGENCY MED. 709, 710 (1984) (noting that 64 of 200
consecutive malpractice claims resulting from emergency department care in Pennsylvania
"were attributable to house officers apparently functioning in a nonsupervised capacity, or to
residents on rotation from specialty training or moonlighting in an unsupervised capacity").).
17. See Richards, supra note 14 at 211 ("[T]he practice of medicine is defined in terms
of the diagnosis and treatment of illness in the manner used by physicians who meet the
training requirements for licensure.").
18. See Erin A. Egan, et al., Comparing Ethics Education in Medicine and Law:
Combining the Best of Both Worlds, 13 ANNALS HEALTH L. 303, 312 (2004) ("The birth of
Western medical ethics is often traced back to the creation of the Hippocratic Oath 2500
years ago.... [T]he oath 'established the Western paradigm of a profession.., as a morally
self-regulating discipline."') (internal citation omitted).
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I will apply, for the benefit of the sick, all measures which are required,
avoiding those twin traps of overtreatment and therapeutic nihilism.
I will remember that there is art to medicine as well as science, and that
warmth, sympathy, and understanding may outweigh the surgeon's knife
or the chemist's drug.
I will not be ashamed to say "I know not," nor will I fail to call in my
colleagues when the skills of another are needed for a patient's recovery.
I will respect the privacy of my patients, for their problems are not
disclosed to me that the world may know. Most especially must I tread
with care in matters of life and death. If it is given me to save a life, all
thanks. But it may also be within my power to take a life; this awesome
responsibility must be faced with great humbleness and awareness of my
frailty. Above all, I must not play at God.
I will remember that I do not treat a fever chart, a cancerous growth, but a
sick human being, whose illness may affect the person's family and
economic stability. My responsibility includes these related problems, if
I am to care adequately for the sick.
I will prevent disease whenever I can, for prevention is preferable to cure.
I will remember that I remain a member of society, with special
obligations to all my fellow human beings, those sound of mind and body
as well as the infirm.
If I do not violate this oath, may I enjoy life and art, respected while I
live and remembered with affection thereafter. May I always act so as to
preserve the finest traditions of my calling and may I long experience the
joy of healing those who seek my help. 19
Observation of attending physicians and patient care during my clinical
rotations in medical school brought me closer to an understanding of my
obligations to truthfulness of practice and ethical behavior. At that time, no
examination existed to test for bedside manner. Many fellow medical
19.

Louis Lasagna, Academic Dean of the School of Medicine at Tufts University,

Hippocratic Oath - Modern Version (1964), available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/

doctors/oathmodem.html (last visited May 13, 2005).
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students uncomfortable with the thought of direct patient care gravitated to
specialty fields that either minimized patient contact, such as radiology or
pathology, or abandoned patient care altogether to pursue careers in
research. Unfortunately, physicians with poor bedside skills also pursued
the clinical practice of medicine or surgery, and when they did, their clinical
activities were more often associated with negligence, medical error, and a
higher rate of malpractice suits compared to physicians with more
competent bedside skills.2 °
The United States Supreme Court has determined that assuring the good
character of physicians is within the state's police power.2' Character is as
important a qualification as knowledge, and if the states may require a basis
of teaching, or certain examination as to the learning, the state may equally
prescribe what evidence of good character will be essential to licensure.22
However, practically speaking, the states rely on the medical schools,
USMLE, and training programs to define appropriate medical practice.23
Medical ethics first entered the formal medical school curriculum in the
1970s in response to "corporate transformation of the nation's health care
system and the rise of managed care and consumerism. '24 Currently, there
is little uniformity among medical schools regarding teaching methods and
ethics curricula. 25 Recent studies have shown that approximately eighty
percent of medical schools offer some formal instruction related to ethics
and professionalism, yet there is a lack of consensus as to the appropriate
method.26 Little emphasis, if any, is given to codes and compliance
20. See the USMLE home page at http://www.usmle.org and link to news section
available at http://www.usmle.org/news/cse/strep2csfaqsll03.htm (last visited July 20,
2004) [hereinafter USMLE home page]. See Frank V. Lefevre, et al., A Survey of Physician
Training Programs in Risk Management and Communication Skills for Malpractice
Prevention, 28 J.L. MED. & ETHIcs 258, 258 (2000) ("Inadequate communication between
physicians, patients, and the patient's family.. . is an important determinant of malpractice
lawsuits.").
21. Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 192-94 (1898).
22. Id. at 194-95.
23. See McLean, supra note 12, at 245.
24. Egan, supra note 18, at 312.
25. Id. See also Serge A. Martinez, Reforming Medical Ethics Education, 30 J.L. MED.
& ETHICS 452, 453-54 (2002).
26. See Herbert M. Swick, et al., Teaching Professionalism in UndergraduateMedical
Education, 282 JAMA 830 (1999) (reporting that in a survey of 116 responding medical
schools, 104 (89.7%) offer "some formal instruction related to professionalism," either
through a "white-coat ceremony" or some other orientation experience, incorporating
professionalism as a component of multiple courses, or teaching professionalism as a single
course). See also James M. DuBois & Jill Burkemper, Ethics Education in U.S. Medical
Schools: A Study of Syllibi, 77 AcAD. MED. 432 (2002) (reporting that in a survey of 87
responding medical schools, 69 (79%) required a formal ethics course but with diverse
methods, including discussion/debates, readings, writing exercises, or lectures).
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issues.27 The only requirement contained in the Liaison Committee on
Medical Education's Standards for Accreditation of Medical Education
Programs provides that "[a] medical school must teach medical ethics and
human values, and require its students to exhibit scrupulous ethical
principles in caring for patients, and in relating to patients' families and to
others involved in patient care. 28 Unfortunately, formal didactic teaching
of professionalism and ethics occurs in the first two years of medical school
and may not be reinforced when the student enters the clinical setting in the
third and fourth years.2 9
Moreover, medical school courses in ethics and professionalism tend to
lack rigorous study, often are graded pass/fail, lack formal assessment, and
are viewed by students as inferior to other courses. 30 "Senior medical
residents identify the observation of role models as the primary mechanism
for professional education. 3 1 Such student-teacher interaction lacks a
formal approach, is considerably variable, and demands that the student
consciously weed out negative role models. Furthermore, it places
demands on teachers in clinical medicine who may have been selected for
their potential to establish a quality research program rather than their
clinical acumen, and competes with demands on teaching physicians to
prioritize maximizing profit for the medical center over addressing concerns
for teaching medical students and residents.32
In mid-2004, the USMLE, in response to a documented association
between physicians with poor clinical skills and higher rates of malpractice,

27. See Egan, supra note 18, at 313-14. See also Anthony Szczygiel, Beyond Informed
Consent, 21 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 171, 238-39 (1994) (noting that the federal government has
imposed mandates affecting health care policy, payment, and the provider patient
relationship including: the Federal Emergency Care Act of 1986 (42 U.S.C. § 1395dd
(1988)), which requires providers to deliver care to any individual who presents to an
emergency room in need of emergency care, regardless of ability to pay for services; the
Patient's Self Determination Act of 1991 (42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(a)(1)(F)(i) (1988)), which
requires hospitals, nursing homes, hospice programs, or home care agencies to provide
notice to the patient of state law rights to decide the course of medical care and the
availability of advance directives; Medicare and Medicaid statutes, which limit the use of
patient restraints for physical safety, available in the American Health Care Association,
Clinical Practice Guidelinesfor the Use of Physical Restraints (1992) (available from the
AHCA, 1201 L Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20005)).
28.

See Egan, supra note 18, at 315 (quoting LIAISON COMM. ON MED. EDUC., Ass'N OF

AM. MED. COLLS., FUNCTIONS AND STRUCTURE OF A MEDICAL SCHOOL: STANDARDS FOR
ACCREDITATION OF MEDICAL EDUCATION PROGRAMS LEADING TO THE M.D. DEGREE 13

(2002)).
29. See Egan, supra note 18, at 315. See also DuBois, supra note 26, at 437.
30. See Egan, supra note 18, at 315-16.
31. See Id. at 319 (citing A. Keith, et al., Senior Residents' Views on the Meaning of
Professionalismand How They Learn About It, 76 ACAD. MED. 734, 735 (2001)).
32. See Egan, supranote 18, at 319-22.
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as well as increased practice costs, established
a "Clinical Skills
Examination" to be administered to all of the approximately 17,000 medical
students applying annually to practice medicine in the United States. 33 The
examination requires each student to take a medical history and conduct a
physical examination of twelve standardized patients and, following each
examination, record the pertinent history and physical findings, list
diagnostic impressions, and outline any plans for further evaluations.34
Following the successful completion of an accredited medical school
curriculum and demonstrating comprehension of the factual knowledge
base embodied by the USMLE, I became fully licensed to practice in the
State of Illinois, as is any physician or surgeon, regardless of age, training,
and clinical expertise. Training in professionalism and ethical behavior,
particularly important to my relationships with patients and physician
colleagues, was the product of my character, mentoring experience, and a
many-centuries-old code of honor and conduct. The future impact of the
35
USMLE Clinical Skills Examination on medical school curriculum,
physician bedside manner, rates of medical malpractice, and ultimately the
cost of health care will take years and perhaps decades to determine.
B.

The PropertyRights of State Medical Licensure

I have been licensed as a physician and surgeon for over twenty years
and have practiced without incurring a malpractice settlement or judgment,
without investigation for false credentialing, fraud, crime, or false
testimony as a medical expert, and without any cause of action or
disciplinary action brought by a fellow physician colleague. I attribute this
to my family, my training and experience, my mentors, common sense and
the ethical concepts embraced by the Hippocratic Oath. The validity and
privilege afforded to me by my Illinois State Medical License has never
been challenged. Yet, if in the future my capability to practice my
profession in either a particular hospital or the State of Illinois comes into
question, examination of the law pertaining to state medical licensure
indicates that I possess a property right in my state medical license
associated with the value and privilege of due process under the United
33. See David A. Binder & Paul Bergman, Taking Lawyering Skills Seriously, 10
CLINICAL L.REv. 191, 212-13 (2003). Current examination requirements for the USMLE
can be found at http://www.usmle.org (last visited July 20, 2004).
34. See USMLE home page, supra note 20.
35. See Med Students Now Must Learn People Skills Too, CHI. TRIB., July 18, 2004, at
C9 (noting that a third year medical student at the University of Nebraska stated that students
might be better off measuring clinical skills during school; this student proposed
requirements for medical schools to make student-patient role-playing evaluations a
mandatory part of the curriculum).
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States Constitution.36
When laws regulating the medical profession are attacked, substantive
due process requires that the exercise of the state's police power not be
unreasonable or unduly oppressive, and that the regulatory means employed
by the legislature have a real and substantive relation to the objects sought
to be obtained.37 The United States Supreme Court has held, "there is no
right to practice
medicine which is not subordinate to the police power of
38
the States."
Beginning in the 1880s, states began to prohibit the performance of
ineffective and dangerous treatments and initiate licensure and scope of
practice acts to regulate the practice of medicine. 39 The United States
Supreme Court first examined state regulation of the practice of medicine in
Dent v. West Virginia.40 The West Virginia law provided three ways to
become licensed: (1) graduate from "a reputable medical college;" (2)
practice medicine in West Virginia continuously for a period of ten years
prior to the licensing act; or (3) pass an examination by members of the
state board of health. 4 1 Dent was fined and enjoined from the practice of
medicine for failing to obtain medical training at a reputable medical
school, claiming a medical degree from the American Medical Eclectic
College of Cincinnati, Ohio.42
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, Dent argued that West
Virginia denied him his property right to practice his profession without due
process of law and due compensation.4 3 The Court held that individuals
have a right "to follow any lawful calling, business, or profession" but this
44
right is subject to state-imposed conditions for the protection of society.
Thereafter, the Court upheld the judgment against Dent, acknowledging that
a state's police power allowed restriction of an individual's right to practice
medicine, unless the restriction bore no relationship to the practice of

36. See Richards, supra note 14, at 213-14. See also Ruth E. Flynn, Demandfor Public
Access to the NationalPractitionerData Bank: Consumers Sound Their Own Death Cry, 18
HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'y 251, 267 (1996) (stating that under the Constitution, physicians
are protected. The various constitutional provisions that afford a physician protection
include the equal protection clause, the due process clauses, the search and seizure clause,
and an implied fundamental right of privacy.)
37. See Katz v. S.D. State Bd. Of Med. & Osteopathic Exam'rs, 432 N.W.2d 274, 279
(S.D. 1988).
38. Lambert v. Yellowley, 272 U.S. 581, 596 (1926).
39. See McLean, supra note 12, at 245.
40. 129 U.S. 114 (1889).
41. Id. at 115-17.
42. Id. at 118.
43. Id. at 121.
44. Id.
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medicine.45 The "Dent decision is emblematic of the deference the United
States Supreme Court accords state medical licensing laws" to deem
qualified individuals competent and worthy of a professional license.46
"States are split as to the standard of proof necessary for a state medical
[licensing] board to revoke a physician's license., 47 Some states hold that a
physician's license can only be revoked if the board's decision is based on
clear and convincing evidence, recognizing a physician's license as a
property interest that warrants due process protection. 48 The majority of
states, however, require state medical licensing boards to base their
decisions on a preponderance of the evidence standard; these states
maintain the position that this standard does not violate a physician's due
process rights and that the interest of public safety substantially outweighs
the private interest of an individual physician.4 9
A physician's ability to obtain a license to practice medicine, with all the
property protections of due process and compensation, requires a basic level
of training. Once licensed by a state medical board, a physician's property
rights will be constitutionally protected, establishing a high threshold for
license revocation or suspension for disciplinary actions, particularly in
states that adhere to a clear and convincing standard. Overall, a licensed
physician may practice with few restraints from the state medical licensing
board.

45. Id. at 114.
46. See Richards, supra note 14, at 218. See Missouri ex rel. Hurwitz v. North, 271 U.S.
40 (1926); Graves v. Minnesota, 272 U.S. 425 (1926); Barsky v. Board of Regents of Univ.
of N.Y., 347 U.S. 442 (1954).
47. See Widmer, supra note 10, at 398.
48. See id. (citing the following state examples: Silva v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. Rptr.2d
577, 578 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993); Rife, M.D. v. Dep't of Prof'l Regulation, 638 So.2d 542, 544
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994); Bottles, M.D. v. Okla. State Bd. of Med. Licensure and
Supervision, 917 P.2d 471, 472 (Okla. 1996); In re Med. License of Dr. Reuben Setliff,
M.D., 645 N.W.2d 601, 605 (S.D. 2002); Nguyen v. State of Wash. Dep't of Health Med.
Quality Assurance Comm'n, 29 P.3d 689, 697 (Wash. 2001); and Devous v. Wyo. State Bd.
of Med. Exam'rs, 845 P.2d 408, 416 (Wyo. 1993)).
49. See Johnson v. Bd. of Governors, 913 P.2d 1339, 1353 (Okla. 1996). Justice
Summers notes in his dissenting opinion, "[t]hirty-nine state medical boards profess to use
the preponderance standard for all offenses." Johnson, 913 P.2d at 1353 (Summers, J.
dissenting) See Widmer, supra note 10, at 398 (citing the following state examples:
Sherman v. Comm'n Licensure to Practice the Healing Art, 407 A.2d 595, 601 (D.C. 1979);
Eaves v. Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 467 N.W.2d 234, 237 (Iowa 1991); Rucker, M.D. v.
Michigan Bd. of Med., 360 N.W.2d 154, 155 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984); In re Ins. Agents'
Licenses of Kane, 473 N.W.2d 869, 875 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991); In re Polk, 449 A.2d 7, 14
(1982); In re Gould v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of State of New York, 103 A.D.2d 897, 897
(N.Y. App. Div. 1984); Larsen v. Comm'n on Med. Competency and N.D. Bd. of Med.
Exam'rs, 585 N.W.2d 801, 805 (N.D. 1998); and Anonymous (M-156-90) v. State Bd. of
Med. Exam'rs, 496 S.E.2d 17, 20 (S.C. 1998).
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DisciplinaryActions Suspending or Revoking PhysicianState Medical
Licensure

The state medical board, "authorized to regulate the medical profession
for the general welfare of its citizens," not only determines the scope of the
medical license, but also establishes conduct that may not be performed by
licensed physicians. ° Ultimately, medical licensure protects the public
from incompetent medical care and deception regarding practitioner
qualifications.5
Through inference, one assumes the guide for state
medical boards is the standard of care and physician conduct as defined by
the minimum qualifications acceptable for successful completion of medical
school education and the passing of the USLME. 52
State medical licensing boards "may revoke a physician's license to
practice medicine for malpractice, gross negligence, . . . professional
incompetence, or similar acts."53 Even so, revocation or suspension of a
physician license by a state disciplinary action is extremely rare.54 When
the state medical licensing boards have acted, the typical disciplinary
actions levied against a physician have been a direct response to drug or
alcohol abuse or the inappropriate prescription of medications. 5 There are
many reasons for the ineffectiveness of state medical licensing boards 5in6
revoking or suspending the medical license of incompetent physicians.
First, decisions brought against physician under the broad authority of the
50. See Widmer, supra note 10, at 396; Richards, supra note 14, at 219; Timothy P.
McCormack, Comment, Expert Testimony and Professional Licensing Boards: What is
Good, What is Necessary, and the Myth of the Majority-MinoritySplit, 53 ME.L. REV. 139,
143-44 (2001); S. SANDY SANBAR, ET AL., LEGAL MEDICINE 97 (Susie H. Baxter ed., Mosby-

Year Book, Inc. 3d ed. 1995).
51. See Mark Hall, Institutional Control of Physician Behavior: Legal Barriers to
Health Care Cost Containment, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 431, 454 (1988); Batty v. Ariz. State
Dental Bd., 112 P.2d 870, 877 (Ariz. 1941) (noting that the purpose of medical licensure is
to "protect the public from those who are not properly qualified"); State ex rel. Lacerenza v.
Osborn, 52 A.2d 747, 749 (Conn. 1947) (stating that statutes are designed to safeguard the
public); Bartron v. Codington County, 2 N.W.2d 337, 342 (S.D. 1942) (stating that the
purpose of medical licensure is to establish a high standard of competence and to protect
patients from the ministrations of a quack); Kelly v. Carroll, 219 P.2d 79, 85 (Wash. 1950)
(stating that the purpose of medical licensure is to "eliminate incompetent persons from
holding themselves out to treat the public").
52. See Kara M. McCarthy, Doing Time for Clinical Crime: The Prosecution of
Incompetent Physicians as an Additional Mechanism to Assure Quality Health Care, 28
SETON HALL L. REV. 569, 588 (1997).

53. McCarthy, supra note 52, at 584.
54. Id.
55. Robert S. Adler, Stalking the Rogue Physician: An Analysis of the Health Care
Quality Improvement Act, 28 AM. Bus. L.J. 683, 693 & nn. 42-43 (1991) (citing OFFICE OF
ANALYSIS AND INSPECTIONS, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, MEDICAL LICENSURE AND
DISCIPLINE: AN OVERVIEW 16 (1986)).

56.

McCarthy, supra note 52, at 585-87.
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state medical licensing boards are subject to judicial review.57 Second,
limited budgets and understaffing of the state medical licensing boards
preclude defending potential lawsuits from physicians contesting
disciplinary actions. 58 Third, physicians have difficulty judging their peers,
leaving a paucity of information available for critical evaluation of an
incompetent physician. 59 Fourth, there are often lengthy delays in the
process by which the state medical boards pursue an incompetent
physician.6"
Fifth, due process requirements demand more than
circumstantial evidence. 61 Lastly, the courts have tended to support state
efforts through state licensing board decisions to limit physicians' scope of
practice only in
regard to regulated narcotics, abortions, and physician62
assisted suicide.
In sum, state medical licensing boards require a minimal qualification for
physicians to establish and maintain a medical license.63 In contrast, a high
threshold exists for revocation or suspension of a physician's established
medical license. 64 In fact, very few cases involving physician incompetence
are ever discussed by state licensing boards.65 Therefore, state medical
licensing boards cannot be relied upon to act efficiently and consistently in
order to effectively police physician misbehavior and incompetence.66

57. Widmer, supra note 10, at 396.
58. McCarthy, supra note 52, at 585.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 587.
61. Id. at 586-87.
62. See Minnesota ex rel. Whipple v. Martinson, 256 U.S. 41, 46-47 (1921) (holding that
the state's police power provides undeniable authority to regulate the administration, sale,
prescription and use of dangerous and habit-forming drugs); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589,
602-06 (1977) (holding that physician reporting to the state of narcotic prescriptions is a
valid public health function that did not pose an unconstitutional burden on the patient's
right of privacy); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 900-01
(1992) (holding that physician reporting to the state of abortion-related information was a
valid public health function that did not pose an unconstitutional burden on the patient's
right of privacy) Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) (stating that the state's rights to
regulate medical practice is only limited when it uses that right to impermissibly interfere
with the constitutional rights of patients); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997)
and Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997) (holding that the state's police power extends to
regulation and banning of physician-assisted suicide).
63. See McCarthy, supra note 52, at 588.
64. See id. at 588-89.
65. See OFFICE OF ANALYSIS AND INSPECTIONS, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL,
MEDICAL LICENSURE AND DISCIPLINE: AN OVERVIEW 16 (1986) (quoting one board executive
director: "[w]e just can't seem to do anything with malpractice. In fact, we've never had a
disciplinary action based on malpractice. It's such tender legal ground, even though we have
a statute.").
66. See Adler, supra note 55, at 692.
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II.
IMPACT OF PHYSICIAN POST-GRADUATE SPECIALTY TRAINING,
DETERMINANTS OF PHYSICIAN'S SCOPE OF PRACTICE BY WAY OF THE
HOSPITAL CREDENTIALING PROCESS AND THE RIGHTS OF HOSPITAL TO
GRANT, LIMIT, OR RETRACT PRIVILEGES THROUGH CREDENTIALING AND
PEER REVIEW ACTIVITY

A.

Physician Specialty Trainingand Implicationsfor Hospital Staff
Privileging

Specialty training and board certification is a voluntary process and is
neither legally required of the physician in order to practice medicine nor
encouraged by the specialty board organizations as a limiting criterion for
hospital credentialing and privileging. 67 Nevertheless, greater than ninety
percent of United States medical school graduates participate in
postgraduate residency training and upon completion of such training apply
for board certification. 68 "The American Board of Medical Specialties
(ABMS) defines a specialty board as a separately incorporated, financially
independent body that determines its requirements and policies for
certification, selects members of its governing body in accordance with
procedures stipulated in its bylaws, accepts candidates for certification from
persons who fulfill its stated requirements, administers examinations, and
issues certificates to those who submit to and pass its examinations. '69 The
ABMS currently recognizes twenty-four boards. 70 Board certification
generally requires graduation from a Liaison Committee on Medical
Education (LCME)-accredited medical school or its equivalent,7'
completion of an Accreditation Committee for Graduate Medical Education
(ACGME)-accredited residency, 72 and successful performance on a
67.

John J. Smith, M.D., J.D., Legal Implications of Specialty Board Certification, 17

J.LEGAL MED.

73, 73 (1996).

68. Id. at 73-74.
69. Id.
70. See AM. BD. OF MED. SPECIALTIES, MEMBER BOARDS & ASSOCIATE MEMBERS,
available at http://www.abms.org/member.asp (last visited May 13, 2005) (recognizing
specialty boards for Allergy and Immunology, Anesthesiology, Colon and Rectal Surgery,
Dermatology, Emergency Medicine, Family Practice, Internal Medicine, Medical Genetics,
Neurological Surgery, Nuclear Medicine, Obstetrics and Gynecology, Ophthalmology,
Orthopedic Surgery, Otolaryngology, Pathology, Pediatrics, Physical Medicine and
Rehabilitation, Plastic Surgery, Preventative Medicine, Psychiatry and Neurology,
Radiology, Surgery, Thoracic Surgery, and Urology).
71. Smith, supra note 62, at 74-75. The LCME is composed of representatives from the
American Medical Association (AMA), the Association of American Medical Colleges
(AAMC), the Committee for Accreditation of Canadian Medical Schools, the United States
federal government, and medical students. Id.
72. Smith, supra note 67, at 75. The ACGME is an association formed by the AMA,
AAMC, ABMS, the American Hospital Association, and the Council of Medical Specialty
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certification examination.7 3 By the early 1990s, specialty boards began to
issue "time limited" certificates requiring a recertification
process to
74
maintain status as a "board certified" specialty physician.
Specialty board certification has been associated with "increased salary
opportunities, lower malpractice insurance rates, admission to hospital
staffs, election to membership in professional societies, and credibility as an
expert witness."75 Health care institutions often limit medical staff
privileges to those that are board eligible or certified, excluding physicians
not eligible for board certification.76
Additional benefits of board
certification include peer recognition, improved patient referral, and
membership and promotion in prestigious professional societies.7 7
Specialty training following medical school graduation and successful
specialty
board certification is also associated with a higher standard of
8
care.

7

In reality, the most fundamental benefit of specialty board certification is
medical staff privileges, particularly for specialists with hospital-based
practices. 79 The American Hospital Association (ALIA) encourages policies
that limit hospital privileges to those physicians that are board eligible.8 °
Ultimately, the governing board of the health care entity is responsible for
"failures in quality which cause an unreasonable risk of injury to
patients. ,,81 Such governing boards, comprised chiefly or entirely of nonSocieties, an organization composed of the various medical specialties. Accreditation
requirements and decisions affecting the respective specialties are made in conjunction with
the appropriate Residency Review Committee (RRC), a specialty-specific committee with
representatives of the AMA, the applicable specialty board, and relevant specialty societies.
Id.
73. Id. at 76. A graduate of an accredited medical school who has completed an
accredited residency must satisfy the clinical proficiency and examination requirements of a
specialty board to achieve certification. The board examination tests factual knowledge, has
minimal character requirements, and often contains a written as well as an oral component.
Id.
74. The author is board certified in Surgery and Thoracic Surgery, both requiring written
and oral examinations. After ten years of practice, the author applied for and successfully
passed recertification examinations (only written required) in both specialties.
75. Smith, supra note 67, at 77.
76. Since 1991, the author has applied for and been accepted to the medical staffs of two
universities and ten community hospitals in the Chicagoland area, all of which required
board eligibility or certification for medical staff privileges.
77. See Smith, supra note 67, at 78.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 77.
80. Id. In addition, the period of board eligibility is finite, typically lasting two years,
during which the candidate may sit for the board certification examination on three
occasions.
81. Paul L. Scibetta, RestructuringHospital-PhysicianRelations: Patient Care Quality
Depends on the Health of HospitalPeer Review, 51 U. PITT. L. REV. 1025, 1032 (1990).

Published by LAW eCommons, 2005

15

Annals of Health Law, Vol. 14 [2005], Iss. 2, Art. 5

Annals of Health Law

[Vol. 14

physicians, must rely upon the hospital medical staff to evaluate the quality
of care provided by individual physicians. 82 The hospital credentialing
process establishes physician fitness to practice at the facility and the scope
of privileges.8 3
B.

HospitalMalpracticeLiabilityRecognizes InstitutionalControl Over
PhysicianDecision-Making

"Early cases held that hospitals were only responsible for accidents
caused by administration, not medical, actions. 84 Modem cases reject this
premise and instead recognize direct corporate responsibility for the quality
of medical treatment within hospitals.
In Bing v. Thunig, the Court of
Appeals of New York held that hospitals are vicariously liable for the
negligence of medical employees.86 In Darling v. Charleston Community
Memorial Hospital, the court recognized corporate responsibility for the
supervision of care rendered in the institution, even by independent
physicians.87 The Darling decision, considered by some scholars to be one
of the most influential hospital law opinions in modem times, rejected the
hospital's contention that control of physician behavior constitutes the
unauthorized practice of medicine and paved the88way for hospital control of
physician members of the hospital medical staff.
The Darling court's creation of direct institutional responsibility for
patient care requires only that hospitals exercise care in the selection of
physicians and take some corrective action when deficient practice is
detected. 89
Institutional oversight is not the exclusive purview of

82. Id.
83. Id. The hospital's credentialing committee refers to past physician performance and
recommendations from peer physicians to determine an individual physician's hospital
privileges and scope of practice.
84. See Hall, supra note 51, at 457.
85. See id. at 458 (citing Fridena v. Evans, 622 P.2d 463 (1980); Tucson Medical Ctr.,
Inc. v. Misevch, 545 P.2d 958 (1976); Darling v. Charleston Cmty. Mem'l Hosp., 211
N.E.2d 253 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966); Bost v. Riley, 262 S.E.2d 391, cert.
denied,269 S.E.2d 621 (1980)).
86. See Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3, 8 (1957).
87. See Darling,211 N.E.2d at 257.
88. Hall, supra note 51, at 458-59.
89. See I. Trotter Hardy, Jr., When Doctrines Collide: Corporate Negligence and
Respondeat Superior When HospitalEmployees Fail To Speak Up, 61 TUL. L. REv. 85, 98
(1986) (noting that Darling has been followed when hospitals have failed to screen
physicians' credentials or terminate their staff privileges). See also Arthur F. Southwick,
HospitalLiability: Two Theories Have Been Merged, 4 J. LEGAL MED. 1, 44 (1983) (noting
that none of the case decisions since Darling has endeavored to imply a direct supervisory
role for lay hospital administrators or trustees).
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90
management but is substantially influenced by physician participation.
Tensions exist between the institutional requirement to impose costsensitive treatment protocols, the tendency to influence medical judgment
with financial rather than medical factors, the preservation of clinical
autonomy, and the prohibition of the unlicensed practice of medicine. 91
"[M]edical peer review is premised on physician responsiveness to
professional rather than lay supervision. ' ' 92 "Peer review encompasses a
wide range of professional activities, including the informal, collegial
oversight and interaction that occur within medical group practices and
hospital medical staffs., 9 3 Quality assurance is an independent function of
peer review activity, separate from cost-containment practice, and directed
at singling out those individual practitioners who lack essential skills or are
neglectful of their patients' welfare. 94 Hospital-based peer review typically
consists of a physician committee whose function is to review and evaluate
the quality of care provided by their colleagues on the medical staff.95 Such
a process for peer review is required by Medicare 96 and the Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO). 97
Following the Darlingdecision, most states passed peer review statutes
in order to protect physicians on peer review committees who terminated
incompetent physicians, often extending immunity from civil action to
anyone present at the peer review committee proceeding and those who

90. See Weiss v. York Hosp., 745 F.2d 786, 796 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding that the medical
staff with the authority to evaluate applications for privileges on behalf of the hospital,
effectively operates as an officer of the hospital). See Gregory G. Peters, Comment,
Reallocating Liability to Medical Staff Review Committee Members: A Response to the
Hospital Corporate Liability Doctrine, 10 AM. J.L. & MED. 115, 128 (1985) ("While the
[hospital governing] board retains control over administration and managerial supervision, it
must delegate clinical evaluation responsibilities to the medical staff. Since the board is
composed primarily of lay members of the community, it lacks the capacity to police the
clinical aspects of a physician's practice.").
91. See Hall, supra note 51, at 461-63.
92. See id. at 462.
93. See Clark C. Havighurst, ProfessionalPeer Review and the Antitrust Laws, 36 CASE
W. RES. L. REv. 1117, 1123 (1986).
94. Id. at 1127-28.
95. See Adler, supra note 55; at 696. In the author's experience, the typical hospital
peer review committee is chaired by the chief medical officer and membership includes the
chairpersons of the hospital clinical departments (Anesthesia, Emergency Medicine,
Medicine, Mental Health, Obstetrics and Gynecology, Radiology, Rehabilitation, and
Surgery) and a physician elected from the medical staff membership at large.
96. See42 U.S.C. §1320c-3.
97. JCAHO, established in 1952, is a private regulatory group consisting of private
physicians and hospital representatives that sets the industry standards and guidelines for
peer review activities. Accreditation by JCAHO qualifies a hospital facility to participate in
Medicare.
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provided information to the committee. 98 "The proponents of peer review
emphasize that medicine is such a specialized field that physicians and
others within the medical community are the only individuals with the
knowledge required to evaluate meaningfully the qualifications and
performance of other medical practitioners." 99 Critics of peer review,
however, have claimed that physicians may not adequately protect the
interests of the public-at-large because: (1) physicians have a reluctance to
pass judgment on their colleagues;10 0 (2) wrongful termination of clinical
privileges may have a devastating effect on a physician's career, making
peer review physicians cautious in their decisions;' 0 ' (3) physicians on peer
review committees are not compensated for their time and energy; 10 2 (4)
physicians have concerns that contribution to the termination of a colleague
may result in loss of referrals, respect, and friends; 10 3 and (5) physician
members of the peer review committee fear that terminated physicians may
4
bring lawsuits against them individually.1
In the absence of a peer review process, the public would be forced to
rely upon the unattractive alternative of the judicial system, tort law, and the
05
successful adjudication of incompetent physicians with malpractice suits.

To terminate incompetent physicians based upon a history of malpractice
suits would have many potential negative impacts. For example, the tort
system experiences considerable delays and may be substantially
inefficient, allowing incompetent physicians to continue to practice while

98. See Alissa Marie Bassler, FederalLaw Should Keep Pace With States and Recognize
a Medical Peer Review Privilege, 39 IDAHO L. REv. 689, 690 (2003). See also Josephine M.
Hammack, The Antitrust Laws and the Medical Peer Review Process, 9 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL'Y 419, 440 (1993); Stephen D. Williger & Maynard A. Buck, A World of
Privilege and Immunity? 49-JAN FED. LAW. 32, 32 (2002) (citing the Ohio peer review
statute, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §2305.25 (A)-(H), providing that "no hospital, society, or
individual who is a member of [a peer review committee] shall be liable in damages for
actions within the scope of the committee functions"); Browning v. Burt, 613 N.E.2d 993,
1007 (Ohio 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1054 (1994) (explaining that confidentiality is
essential to effective functioning of peer review committee meetings, and these meetings are
essential to the continued improvement in the care and treatment of patients).
99. See Christopher S. Morter, The Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986: Will
Physicians FindPeer Review More Inviting? 74 VA. L. REv. 1115, 1115 (1988).
100. See Adler, supra note 55, at 697.
101. Compare Morter, supra note 99, at 1118 with Jacqueline Oliverio, Hospital
Liabilityfor Defamation of CharacterDuring the Peer Review Process: Sticks and Stones
May Break My Bones, But Words May Cost Me, 92 W. VA. L. REv. 739, 740-41 (1990).
102. See Adler, supranote 55, at 697.
103. See Hammack, supra note 98, at 442.
104. See Ronald G. Spaeth et al., Quality Assurance and Hospital Structure: How the
Physician Relationship Affects Quality Measures, 12 ANNALS HEALTH L. 235, 237-38, 241
(2003).
105. See Hammack, supra note 98, at 443.
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adverse cases are adjudicated by the court system. Additionally, the modest
predictive value of malpractice claims history due to the relative rare
occurrence of malpractice suits in comparison to the rate of medical error
could result in wrongful termination of competent physicians. Finally, the
cost of health care would further escalate as the number of lawsuits
10 6
increases and physicians respond with a "defensive medicine" approach.
In the mid-1980s Congress enacted legislature in response to the negative
impact of rising medical malpractice insurance rates, the cost of defensive
medicine, the ineffectiveness of the state licensing board system to
discipline incompetent physicians, and the high likelihood that physicians
with a revoked or suspended medical license in one state would merely
move to another state and resume practice. 107 The Health Care Quality
Improvement Act of 1986 (HCQIA) formalized federal support for the peer
review system and constituted a significant step toward identifying and
removing incompetent physicians from the practice of medicine. 10 8 Overall,
the HCQIA provides legal immunity for peer review activities and
establishes a national clearinghouse for information on physicians.
Specifically, to fall under the umbrella of immunity from federal or state
law, the HCQIA mandates that the professional peer review activities must
be taken:
(1) in the reasonable belief that the action was taken in the furtherance of
quality health care, (2) after a reasonable effort to obtain the facts of the
matter, (3) after adequate notice and hearing procedures are afforded to
the physician involved or after such other procedures as are fair to the
physician under the circumstances, and (4) in the reasonable belief that
106.

See id. at 443-45.
See Adler, supra note 55, at 684-92 (citing a study in which at least forty-nine of
122 physicians disciplined by a state medical board relocated to another state and continued
practicing medicine).
108. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101-52 (2004). In the first section of HCQIA Congress set forth
the findings underlying the Act:
(1) The increasing occurrence of medical malpractice and the need to improve the
quality of medical care have become nationwide problems that warrant greater
efforts than those that can be undertaken by any individual State.
(2) There is a national need to restrict the ability of incompetent physicians to
move from State to State without disclosure or discovery of the physicians
previous damaging or incompetent performance.
(3) This nationwide problem can be remedied through effective professional peer
review.
(4) The threat of private money damage liability under Federal laws, including
treble damage liability under Federal antitrust law, unreasonably discourages
physicians from participating in effective professional peer review.
(5) There is an overriding national need to provide incentive and protection for
physicians engaging in effective professional peer review. Id.

107.
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the action was warranted by the facts known after such reasonable1 effort
to obtain facts and after meeting the requirement of paragraph (3). 09
The HCQIA does not extend immunity to actions brought by the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC), the Department of Justice (DOJ), state
authorities pursuing antitrust or civil rights claims, or disciplined physicians

with private suits seeking injunctive or declaratory relief.1 10
Albeit

limited

and qualified, the

HCQIA

established

significant

immunity to peer review activity, particularly shielding either physician
members of the committee or physicians providing good faith information
to the committee from liability for damages resulting from an antitrust suit
brought by a disciplined physician. i ' The HCQIA left undisturbed the
discovery rights established by state peer review privilege statutes, 1 2 and
the due process requirement of adequate notice and hearing has been

broadly interpreted.'1 13 Furthermore, physicians protected by the immunities
of the HCQIA may14seek attorneys' fees from unsuccessful disciplined

physician-plaintiffs.

The HCQIA also established a National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB)
to which the following three reports must be filed: (1) physician payments
to settle malpractice claims;1 15 (2) disciplinary actions taken by state boards
109. 42 U.S.C. §11112(a) (1998). See Williger, supra note 93, at 33 (noting that the
state requires that the activities be reasonable, based on the objective standard, rather than
merely subjective and supported by good faith. Further, HCQIA establishes a presumption
that the peer review activity meets these requirements, unless rebutted by a preponderance of
the evidence).
110. See Adler, supra note 55, at 719 n.177 (stating that if the professional review
actions being challenged fail to meet the standards of § 11112, no immunity is provided and a
suit brought by a disciplined physician can be tried without the protections provided by the
HCQIA).
111. See id. at 720.
112. See id. at 726-27 (noting that the HCQIA differs with respect to discovery rights in
administrative disciplinary proceedings).
113. See Williger, supra note 98, at 33. See also Adler, supra note 55, at 727 (noting
that the full set of procedural rights under HCQIA need not be provided to a physician where
a peer review committee investigates a matter but does not take adverse action, where the
peer review committee suspends a physician for fourteen days or less during on-going
investigation for further action, or when immediate suspension or restriction of clinical
privileges are imposed where an imminent danger exists to the health of any individual).
114. 42 U.S.C. § 11113 (1998) (explaining that a substantially prevailing defendant can
seek attorney's fees and costs if the plaintiffs claim, or the claimant's conduct during the
litigation of the claim was "frivolous, unreasonable, without foundation, or in bad faith").
115. 42 U.S.C. §11131(b) (1998). The HCQIA requires the following information to be
reported:
(1) the name of any physician or licensed health care practitioner for whose
benefit the payment is made, (2) the amount of the payment, (3) the name (if
known) of any hospital with which the physician or practitioner is affiliated or
associated, (4) a description of the acts or omissions and injuries or illnesses upon
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of medical examiners;' 16 and (3) sanctions adopted by hospitals and other
health care entities.' 17 Health care entities must request physician
information from the NPDB when considering the granting of staff
privileges to a physician and every two years for existing staff
physicians. 118
"The purpose of the NPDB is to impede the movement of incompetent
physicians from [s]tate to [s]tate without disclosure or discovery of the
previous damaging or incompetent performance." 119 In this manner, the
120
immunity privileges of the HCQIA work in conjunction with the NPDB.
The peer review committee's duty to report to the state medical licensing
board any review action that adversely affects the clinical privileges of a
physician and to properly and timely request physician information from
the NPDB, provided the peer review committee's actions are in good faith
and reasonable, will establish immunity under the HCQIA. 121 Failure of the
health care entity to report required information
will result in forfeiture of
22
immunity for a period of three years.1
Thus, the hospital peer review committee is the cornerstone of hospital
credentialing and review of individual physician clinical activity, thereby
facilitating the hospital's duty to deliver quality medical care to the public.
Federal and state statutes work jointly to provide protections for peer
review activity by extending confidentiality and immunity to those
physicians in good faith peer review and mandating the reporting of
wrongful physician conduct to the NPDB. "Physicians, courts and
commentators frequently laud the medical review process as the most
effective and efficient method of professional self-regulation in the
field."' 123 Alternatively, the hospital, by way of the decisions of the hospital
board, credentials committee, and peer review committee, may allow any
individual medical staff physician considerable freedom to practice within
the broad boundaries of his or her state medical license.

which the action or claim was based, and (5) such other information as the
Secretary [of the Department of Health and Human Services] determines is
required for appropriate interpretation of information reported under [the Act].
Id.
116. 42 U.S.C. §11132 (1988).
117. 42 U.S.C. §11133 (1988).
118. 42 U.S.C. §11135 (1988).
119. 42 U.S.C. §11101 (1988).
120. See Williger, supranote 98, at 34.
121. See id.
122. 42 U.S.C. §I1111 (1988).
123. George E. Newton II, Maintaining the Balance: Reconciling the Social and
Judicial Costs of Medical PeerReview Protection,52 ALA. L. REv. 723, 724 (2001).
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III.

RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUAL PHYSICIANS FACING LIMITATION OF
HOSPITAL PRIVILEGES

A.

PhysicianProtectionsfrom Adverse Medical StaffJudgments

Traditionally, physicians are not entitled to membership on a medical
staff or privileges at a hospital as a matter of right. 124 Although a license to
practice a profession is a valuable right deserving of protection by the laws,
staff membership is not afforded the same considerations as a constitutional
or inherent right.12 5 Private hospitals have an absolute right to exclude
licensed physicians from their medical staffs, and decisions regarding the
granting or denial of medical staff privileges are not subject to judicial
review. 126 However, at public hospitals, a physician is entitled
to
127
membership or to a hearing on refusal of medical staff privileges.
On the other hand, the United States Supreme Court recognizes a federal
cause of action by a physician against a hospital and/or medical peer review
committee that has denied or revoked the physician's medical staff
privileges in violation of the Sherman Act. 128 To prevail in such an antitrust
claim, the physician excluded from the medical staff must show something
more than a recommendation by competitors on the medical peer review
committee to revoke or terminate his or her privileges.129 The most
common antitrust allegation brought by physician-plaintiffs in medical staff
124. Hayman v. City of Galveston, 273 U.S. 414, 416-17 (1927) ("It cannot.., be said
that all licensed physicians have a constitutional right to practice their profession in a
hospital .... ).
125. Wallington v. Zinn, 118 S.E.2d 526, 528 (W. Va. 1961).
126. Pepple v. Parkview Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 511 N.E.2d 467 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987); State
ex rel. Sams v. Ohio Valley Gen. Hosp. Ass'n, 140 S.E.2d 457, 462 (W. Va. 1965).
127. See State ex reL Sams, 140 S.E.2d at 463.
128. Summit Health Ltd. v. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322 (1991) (holding that the interstate
commerce requirement of the Sherman Act was met by a single hospital's revocation of one
physician's staff privileges as a result of the hospital's peer review process. For a physician
to successfully litigate an antitrust suit against a hospital for the denial of staff privileges
under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, the physician must prove: (1) an effect on interstate
commerce, thereby fulfilling the jurisdictional requirement; (2) a conspiracy or combination;
and (3) a restraint of trade. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7).
129. See Bozcar v. Manatee Hosps. & Health Sys., Inc., 993 F.2d 1514 (11th Cir. 1993)
(vacating judgment for defendants where there was sufficient evidence to allow the jury to
conclude that the hospital conspired with staff obstetrician/gynecologists to terminate
privileges of competing ob/gyns; it was reasonable to infer that the hospital participated in
conspiracy in order to avoid additional dissatisfaction and defections among staff ob/gyns
and to minimize costs and liabilities related to plaintiff's frequent allegations of hospital
deficiencies). See also Oltz v. St. Peter's Cmty. Hosp., 861 F.2d 1440 (9th Cir. 1988)
(finding that the hospital violated antitrust laws when, facing the threat of losing its four
physician anesthesiologists, conspired with the medical staff to exclude a nurse anesthetist
who charged lower fees).

http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol14/iss2/5

22

Gunnar: The Scope of a Physician's Medical Practice: Is the Public Adequa

20051

The Scope of a Physician's Medical Practice

privilege cases is that exclusion from the medical staff constitutes a group
boycott. 30 In rural areas where there may be only one hospital or a single
hospital with high-technology medical equipment, physicians who have
been denied medical staff privileges commonly bring' 3actions for Sherman
Act violations under the "essential facilities doctrine.' '
To overcome the qualified immunity provisions provided by the peer
review statutes and survive summary judgment in a defamation or antitrust
action, the physician-plaintiff must prove that the denial or revocation of
medical staff privileges was the result of the peer review committee
members acting either in bad faith, with malice, or "without a reasonable
belief that the action taken or recommendation made was warranted under
the known facts."' 132 Such a burden is not insurmountable. The peer review
statutes protect only the work product of the review proceeding, not the
underlying substantive evidence, therefore the physician-plaintiff bringing
an action against the peer review committee33members is not precluded from
obtaining evidence from an original source.'
Furthermore, because peer review litigation often occurs in federal
courts, "the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may provide a loophole
through which state peer review discovery protections can slip.' ' 134 Since
neither the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 (HCQIA) nor
federal common law specifically affords a discovery privilege for peer
review committees, the work product of the peer review process may lose
its immunity in federal court. 135 Federal Rule of Evidence 501 governs
privileges and states, "[t]he privilege of a witness, person, government,
State, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of
the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United
States in the light of reason and experience.' 36 "In contrast to most state
See DAVID MARX, JR. & JAMES H. SNEED, ANTITRUST & HEALTHCARE: MEETING
130.
THE CHALLENGE, 221 (Wash. D.C. American Health Lawyers Assoc. 1998)
131. Id.
132. See Newton, supra note 123, at 740-41 (citing Smith v. Our Lady of the Lake
Hosp., 639 So. 2d 730 (La. 1994) (upholding summary judgment for the defendant hospital
in a suit brought by a physician against the hospital and members of the peer review
committee, the court reasoning "mere allegations of malice and bad faith, even with
specifications of personal animosity and possible prior overreaching of authority, will not
suffice to allow an action against hospital personnel engaging in peer review").).
133. See Newton, supra note 123, at 736. See also Irving Healthcare Sys. v. Brooks,
927 S.W.2d 12, 18 (Tex. 1996) (holding that defendant's work product was privileged in a
case brought by a physician against a hospital alleging wrongful denial of staff privileges but
stated, "there are several means by which confidential information may be disclosed to an
affected physician.")
134. See Williger, supra note 98, at 34.
135. See id.
136. Fed. R. Evid. 501.
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courts,... federal courts have rejected the privileged character of...
academic peer review communications."13' 7
A recent article reviewed health care antitrust cases between 1985 and
1999, identifying 542 opinions in a database representing 394 separate
antitrust disputes. 38 Federal district courts accounted for 347 opinions
(64%), federal appeals courts for 191 opinions (35%), and the United States
Supreme Codart a mere 4 opinions (1%). 13 9 Private antitrust suits dominated
public ones in terms of the number of cases resolved by the courts.
Litigation by public enforcement agencies generated only 22 of the 394
health care antitrust disputes (6%) compared to 372 disputes (94%) brought
by private plaintiffs. 140 Of the total number of private disputes, physicians
in solo or small group practice represented the largest plaintiff group,
accounting for 195 disputes (53%). 141 "Hospitals constituted the largest
defendant pool (225 disputes; 61%), followed by solo or small group
physicians (124 disputes; 33%).,,142 The most common plaintiff-defendant
pairing was physicians against hospitals (166 disputes; 45%) and
the second
143
most common pairing involved physicians against physicians.
This study revealed that the most common type of private claim brought
by a physician against a hospital involved a physician suing the hospital and
its staff physicians who had denied the physician membership on the
hospital medical staff, alleging that the action was taken to prevent
competition from the newcomer (129 disputes, 35%).' 44 Nearly half of
these staff privilege disputes involved small cities or towns (57 disputes;
44%), with the remainder involving large cities (25 disputes; 20%), suburbs
(23 disputes; 18%), and rural areas (24 disputes; 18%). 145 While the total
number of disputes remained constant over the fifteen year period, staff
privilege cases declined from 51 (39%) during the years 1985 to 1989, to 34
(28%) during the years 1995 to 1999.146 When court opinions were
examined in the staff privilege cases, the plaintiffs prevailed in only twelve
137. See Bassler, supranote 98, at 698.
138. Peter J. Hammer, William M. Sage, Antitrust, Health Care Quality, and the Courts,
102 COLUM. L. REv. 545, 553-55 (2002).
139. Id.at 562.
140. Id. at 565-66.
141. Id.at 566.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Hammer, supra note 138, at 568. The second, related pattern challenges a
hospital's decision to grant an exclusive contract to one physician or physician group to
provide professional services in a department of the hospital, such as the emergency room or
radiology suite (106 disputes; 28%).
145. Id. at 574.
146. Id. at 597.
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opinions (7%).147 Only two of the staff privilege cases
(2%) resulted in
148
damage awards being awarded to the physician-plaintiff.
The authors of this study concluded, among other things, that the
physician-plaintiff bringing an antitrust action against a hospital and the
physician staff that denied him privileges has a remarkably low rate of
success either for award of damages or for equitable relief.149 This may be
the result of the physician-plaintiff's attorney failing to effectively counsel
his or her client in pursuing a staff privilege antitrust dispute. 50 Further,
the "courts recognize the [inherent] weaknesses of most medical antitrust
claims and are fairly effective in weeding them out."'' Lastly, the decline
in private antitrust lawsuits brought52by the fifteen year period of study
represents the impact of the HCQIA. 1
There are several possible explanations for why physicians continue to
bring private antitrust claims against hospitals and medical staff physicians
for denial of medical staff privileges. First, denial of staff privileges is
deeply personal and reflects on the physician's reputation and/or
competence. 53 Second, the physician has the financial resources to
subsidize the litigation. 54 Third, lack of access to a preferred hospital may
cost the physician his livelihood and he may be willing to go substantial
lengths to prevent that from occurring.' 55 Finally, the antitrust claim serves
1 56
as a means to anchor the dispute in federal court rather than state court.
Therefore, hospitals, through the decisions and actions of their physician
member credentialing and peer review committees, may select the
membership of their medical staffs and determine the scope of practice of
each individual medical staff physician. State peer review statutes and the
HCQIA provide considerable, albeit qualified, legal protections which
147. Id. at 575.
148. Id.at 576.
149. Id. at 596.
150. Hammer, supra note 138, at 601 (commenting that fewer claims would be filed if
the plaintiff's attorney was reimbursed on a contingency fee basis).
151. Id. at601-02.
152. Id. at 597-98.
153. Id. at 600-01.
154. Id.at 600.
155. Id.at601.
156. Hammer, supra note 138, at 598. See also Jacqueline Oliverio, Hospital Liability
for Defamation of CharacterDuring the Peer Review Process: Sticks and Stones May Break
My Bones, But Words May Cost Me, 92 W. Va. L. Rev. 739, 741 (1990) (commenting that
state court "causes of action brought by physicians against Peer Review Boards, medical
staffs, and hospitals include: violation of medical staff bylaws, breach of contract, violation
of due process and equal protection, conspiracy, tortious interference with a contractual
business relationship, intentional infliction of emotional distress,... and defamation [of
character].").
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allow hospitals to extend, deny, or revoke any individual physician's
medical staff privileges or scope of practice. A physician bringing state and
federal causes of action against a hospital and physician members of the
hospital's medical staff for the denial or revocation of staff privileges has an
expensive, uphill battle with little chance of success.
IV.

PUBLIC'S LIMITED RIGHTS TO INFORMATION REGARDING CERTAIN
PHYSICIAN BEHAVIOR THAT COULD TRIGGER LOSS OF HOSPITAL
PRIVILEGES AND POTENTIAL FORFEITURE OF MEDICAL LICENSE OR
ABILITY TO PRACTICE WITHIN A SPECIALTY

A.

The Public'sLimited Knowledge of Physician Qualifications
157
Antitrust laws protect and promote competition in the marketplace.
Scholars argue whether the specific goals of antitrust laws exist solely to
enhance consumer welfare through the efficient allocation of resources, or
whether efficiency must sometimes be sacrificed to protect alternative
values, such as wealth transfer, entrepreneurial opportunity, and the
prevention of the spread of big business. 58 Argument aside, competition
in
59
a properly functioning market is the foundation of antitrust law. 1
Market failures unfortunately do occur, producing an inefficient
allocation of resources and economic power thereby negatively impacting
business opportunity and consumer welfare. 60 One common reason for
market failure follows informational asymmetries, where "consumers of
goods do not possess adequate knowledge with which to evaluate the
quality" of goods. 161 Informational asymmetries are "often seen in markets
for professional services such as medicine, law or education, where the
nature of the service provided is [sufficiently] complex [such that] the
ordinary consumer [cannot] adequately determine the actual value of [the
purchase]". 162 Lacking adequate knowledge concerning quality, the
consumer may settle for a service 63of suboptimal value, which is inefficient
and harmful to consumer welfare. 1
Currently, the general public does not have access to any of the

157. Heather S. Crall, Unreasonable Restraints: Antitrust Law and the National
Residency Matching Program,82 WASH. U. L. Q. 245, 249 (2004).
158. Id. at 250-51.
159. Id. at 251.
160. Id. at 252.
161. Id. at 252-53.
162. Id.
163. Crall, supra note 157, at 252-53.
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64 Thus, the
information in the National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB).
patient consumer cannot obtain any information about a treating physician
from this source regarding a history of malpractice judgments and
settlement payments, disciplinary sanctions, and license suspensions and
revocations. 165 The Office of the Inspector General of the Department of
Health and Human Services (OIG) can impose civil monetary sanctions on
parties violating these confidentiality provisions. 166
Patient rights
advocates, motivated by a general concern for declining quality of health
care, have argued that medical consumers should be able67to use the NPDB
to screen physicians and thereby avoid incompetent ones.
The strongest argument presented by patient rights advocates "for giving
medical consumers information about their physicians is based on the
doctrine of informed consent, which holds that to avoid committing a
battery or negligence a physician must fully inform a patient of all risks
associated with a procedure. 168 If the patient is not fully informed, the
consent is meaningless. 69 The informed consent doctrine encompasses the
patient's right to know information regarding a physician's ability to
70
practice medicine that might affect the patient's willingness to consent.
Therefore, the goal of patient rights advocates is to obtain as much relevant
information as possible regarding a treating
physician to best empower the
17
patient in making a treatment decision. '

Consequently, the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986

164. 42 U.S.C. § 11137(b)(1) (1995 & Supp. 1 2004).
165. Julie Barker Pape, Physician Data Banks: The Public's Right to Know Versus the
Physician'sRight to Privacy, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 975, 977 (1997).
166. 42 U.S.C. § 11 137(b)(2) (1995 & Supp. I 2004) (imposing a penalty of not more
than $10,000 if information is illegally obtained or disclosed).
167. Pape, supranote 165, at 978.
168. Id. at 986.
169. Id.
170. See Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 483 (Cal. 1990) (holding that
a patient has a right to know a physician's economic incentives); see also Estate of
Behringer v. Med. Ctr. at Princeton, 592 A.2d 1251, 1283 (N.J. 1991) (finding no
discrimination where a hospital required a surgeon to disclose his HIV status to potential
surgical patient); see also In re Milton S. Hershey Med. Ctr. of Pa. State Univ., 595 A.2d
1290, 1302 (Pa. 1991) (upholding a court order allowing a hospital to inform potential
patients of a physician's HIV status on grounds that the potential danger to patients
outweighs the physician's privacy interest).
171. See Pape, supra note 165, at 986-87 (arguing that the informed consent theory fails
to provide adequate justification for releasing all physician information to the general public
because the information needed for consent implies a specific treatment and a specific
patient-physician relationship). See also Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605 (1977)
(specifying that although the federal and state governments can constitutionally collect
information on the performance of physicians, the physician has an informational privacy
interest when the information is compiled in computerized records).
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(HCQIA), in effect, through its privacy protections of physician
information, establishes a physician property right in the information
collected by the NPDB.172 Privacy protections are necessary because the
73
data collected is never expunged and is without opportunity for retrieval;
reporting to the NPDB is inconsistent; 174 physicians are not granted a
hearing before malpractice is reported; 1 75and public dissemination of the
physician's NPDB information may cause loss of patient referrals, income,
or employment. 76
"The medical profession argues that exposing
177
physicians to such publicity threatens both their reputation and privacy.'
CONCLUSION

The United States health care system faces a number of problems today,
including the rising cost of health care delivery, a high rate of medical error,
the substantial cost of defensive medicine, and rising medical malpractice
insurance rates.
The continued practice of incompetent physicians
negatively impacts the quality and cost of health care. Medical error is not
always the result of physician negligence; physician incompetence will also
produce medical error, which can result in patient injury or death.
Revoking the privileges of an incompetent physician has been the goal of
the federal and state governments, the state medical licensing boards, and
hospitals through the oversight of credentialing and peer review activity.
Unfortunately, incompetent physicians continue to practice, protected by
the considerable rights embodied by their medical license and a minimal
professional standard. State medical licensing boards cannot be expected to
revoke or terminate a physician's medical license when the professional
standard for acquiring a medical license is merely a medical school
education, one year of post-graduate training, and passing the United States
Medical Licensing Examination (USMLE). Thankfully, the USMLE has
acted on the known correlation between physician incompetence and
deficiencies in professional and ethical training through the addition of a
standardized "Clinical Skills Examination." However, the effect of this

172. See Pape, supra note 165, at 993 n.120 (explaining that placing of information into
data banks reinforces the "concept of property rights because it gives a more concrete form
to the information, which then becomes a commodity that can be bought and sold on the
open market").
173. See Flynn, supra note 36, at 266-68.
174. See id.at 267 (arguing that the NPDB "creates a situation where, because of
differences in state disciplinary standards, two physicians, having engaged in the same
conduct, may not" both be reported).
175. See id.at 268.
176. See Flynn, supra note 36, at 268.
177. See Pape, supra note 165, at 989.
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modification to the requirements of state medical licensure on limiting
physician incompetence will take years to determine.
Currently in the United States, the cornerstone for policing physician
behavior is credentialing and peer review by the hospital medical staff.
Remarkably, physicians are unable to adequately police themselves.
Physicians do not uniformly acknowledge, investigate, and reprimand
incompetent physician behavior, despite the immunity and confidentiality
extended to peer review activities by state and federal statute. The fear-oflawsuit argument does not account for physicians' reluctance to adequately
judge their peers since historical data shows the physician-plaintiff has a
near-zero chance of success. Further, the disciplined physician bringing an
action against a peer review physician or hospital is deterred by the
potential responsibility for the defendant's legal fees under the mandates of
the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 (HCQIA).
Therefore, Congress must mandate further requirements of the peer
review process. Specifically, legislation is needed to standardize guidelines
for peer review reporting of below-standard physician conduct. Without
nationally standardized guidelines for peer review to compliment the
HCQIA, reporting to state medical licensing boards and the National
Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB) is inconsistent comparing hospital-tohospital and/or state-to-state.
The potential exists for incompetent
physician behavior to go unrecognized. For example, the physician might
have a large practice important to hospital revenue, or the physician might
be popular with the members of the peer review committee members, and
might never be objectively scrutinized. The state medical licensing boards
and the NPDB must receive reliable reporting of physician activity that falls
below the standard of care. Such nationally recognized guidelines would
178
compliment technological advancements and the reality of telemedicine.
Furthermore, the federal government must acknowledge through
legislation that the public is best served when the delivery of specialty
health care is provided by board certified physicians. Physicians practicing
highly technical procedures requiring additional training must be required
to show knowledge of a heightened professional standard embodied by
board certification. Residency training and specialty board certification
must have greater significance regarding scope of practice. For example,
physicians unable to successfully meet the requirements of the Board of
Thoracic Surgery should not be allowed to perform open heart surgery, and
physicians without board certification in neurosurgery should not perform
brain surgery.
178. C.f Erin K. Grunzke, Long-Distance Doctors: The Crossroads of Telemedicine
Licensure in Ill., 89 ILL. B.J. 362 (2001).
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Board certification establishes a higher and appropriate standard of care
for physicians practicing within the scope of the specialty. The tort system
recognizes a heightened standard of care for the delivery of specialty health
care. Recent court decisions support the oversight of medical expert
testimony by the professional societies that establish criteria for board
certification, thereby assuring that medical expert testimony represents the
179
accepted and heightened standard of care for board certified physicians.
Specialist physicians delivering patient care below the standard of care
established by the minimum knowledge and skill requirements of board
certification are practicing negligently. By definition, those physicians who
never trained in a subspecialty, or trained and failed to pass or maintain
board certification, do not acknowledge or understand the established
standard of care for the given specialty.
Unfortunately, at the present time, physicians who fail to meet the
standards established by the professional specialty boards may practice that
specialty under the broad privilege of a state medical license. Hospitals that
have difficulty attracting board certified physicians may elect to credential
non-board certified specialty physicians in order to establish a specialty care
program.18 0 Hospitals should not have this option. This view is consistent
with the philosophy of the American Hospital Association (AHA). At a
minimum, hospitals must be required to support programs of highly
technical specialty procedures with board certified physicians.
Federal legislation that establishes board certification for the practice of
specialty medical care would result in lowered rates of medical error,
physician negligence, physician incompetence, and medical malpractice
insurance premiums for the specialties with the highest current rates.
Health care delivery costs would decrease and the quality of the health care
delivered to the public would improve.
The free market and physician competition among specialists would be
preserved; however, federal legislation that limits the delivery of specialty
179.

See Michael D. Brophy, Ruling May Signal New Chapter in Expert Testimony of

Medical Society Members, MED. MALPRACTICE L. & STRATEGY, May 2002, at 1; Austin v.

American Ass'n of Neurological Surgeons, 253 F.3d 967, 973 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that
Dr. Austin, representing medical expert testimony for the plaintiff, testified unprofessionally
and was liable to sanctions by the professional society).
180. The Veterans Administration Hospitals do not require board certification for
hospital privileging and credentialing. VETERANS HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT

VHA HANDBOOK 1100.19: PRIVILEGING AND CREDENTIALING §
5(e)(1)
(2001),
available
at
http://wwwl .va.gov/vhapublications/
ViewPublication.asp?pubID=357 (last visited May 13, 2005). The Department of Veterans
Affairs Health Care Personnel Enhancement Act of 2004, recently signed by President Bush,
will increase physician pay in January 2006, based upon location, specialty and need, thus
attracting board certified specialists to positions previously reimbursed at below-market
rates. Pub. L. No. 108-445, 118 Stat. 2636 (2004).
OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,

http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol14/iss2/5

30

Gunnar: The Scope of a Physician's Medical Practice: Is the Public Adequa

2005]

The Scope of a Physician's Medical Practice

care to board certified physicians must also protect the professional
societies from lawsuits brought by physicians without board certification.
Non-board certified physicians must be prohibited from bringing federal
antitrust suits against professional societies that establish criteria for board
certification. Granted, federal legislation that limits specialty care to board
certified specialists and protects the professional societies that establish
criteria for board certification is inherently anticompetitive, the interests of
the public are overriding.
Federal legislation that limits the delivery of specialty health care to
board certified physicians is not unreasonably anticompetitive. First,
physicians that lack board certification may continue to practice medicine
under the broad privilege of their state medical license even though their
privilege to practice a specialty must be constructively revoked. Second,
the federal government has an overriding responsibility to protect the public
from incompetent medical care. Third, few barriers exist that limit nonboard certified physicians desiring to practice specialty medicine from
entering the market; a non-board certified physician always has the option
of obtaining specialty board certification through American Board of
Medical Specialities (ABMS)-approved pathways.
Medical specialty boards and board certification must have a greater
impact on a physician's scope of professional medical practice. This
country's health care system can no longer support the jack-of-all-trades
general practitioner who performs lung surgery and general surgery,
delivers babies, and makes house calls. There is primary care and then
there is specialty care. The public must be reassured that the physician
performing specialized care is appropriately credentialed and his
professional activity monitored.
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